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That’s a Fine Chablis
You’re Not Drinking:
The Proper Place for Geographical
Indications in Trademark Law
Moderator: Justin Hughes∗
Panelists: Lynne Beresford†
Annette Kur‡
Kenneth Plevan§
Susan Scafidi||
MR. MASKEL: Good morning. My name is Greg Maskel, and
I am the Managing Editor of the Fordham Intellectual Property,
Media & Entertainment Law Journal. The IPLJ has been looking
forward to today for quite some time, and we are so glad to
assemble a conference to discuss cutting-edge issues in intellectual
property law.
The IPLJ publishes four books per year, and we are currently
working on our seventeenth volume. Please stop by our table in
the Atrium and have a look at our most recent books.
Now we will begin our second panel of the day, where the
panelists will discuss geographical indications in trademark law.
We have a distinguished moderator for the panel, Professor
Justin Hughes. Professor Hughes teaches intellectual property,
∗

Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (New York).
Commissioner of Trademarks, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Washington).
‡
Professor, Max-Planck Institute for Intellectual Property (Munich).
§
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (New York).
||
Visiting Professor, Fordham Law School; Professor of Law & History, Southern
Methodist University (Dallas).
†
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Internet law, and international trade courses at Cardozo Law
School here in New York. He also serves as Director of the Law
School’s Intellectual Property Program. He was an attorney
advisor at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office from 1997 to
2001. Prior to that, he clerked for the Lord President of the
Supreme Court of Malaysia and worked in private practice. A
well-known expert in intellectual property law, Professor Hughes
is a frequent witness at congressional hearings and has written
extensively on Internet, copyright, and patent law. He has taught
at Cardozo since the year 2000.
Professor Hughes.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Thank you.
We have a great panel today. Although this is the trademark
panel, the subject is actually GIs. Now, when you go and tell
someone that you were at a panel on GIs today, they will assume
you were at a hospital or a medical center. I had this incident arise
with a very important IP professor, when I said, “we’re doing GIs,”
and she asked about my health.
But, no. Here GIs are geographical indications. Geographical
indications are a very interesting and unusual form of intellectual
property. When we talk about them as geographical indications,
we are really speaking at the level of international legal norms.
“Geographical indications” is the right term for this type of
intellectual property at the international level, where the TRIPs
Agreement protects geographical indications.1
The TRIPs Agreement’s protection of geographical indications
is quite unusual in that the Agreement first provides for general
protection for all geographical indications,2 and then affords
special, elevated protection to geographical indications that
concern wine and spirits.3
1

See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, arts. 22–
24, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33
I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs].
2
See TRIPs art. 22.
3
See id. art. 23(1)–(3). For a complete discussion of these provisions, see Justin
Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate about Geographical
Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299 (2006).
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The most important—and in a way the most interesting—
aspect of the TRIPs Agreement’s geographical indications
protection is the fact that the TRIPs Agreement itself calls for
continued negotiations regarding further protection of geographical
indications in three areas of the Agreement.4 Those of you who
have studied international intellectual property and the TRIPs
Agreement know that this is quite unusual. The patent provisions
and the copyright provisions of TRIPs, as well as its other
trademark provisions, are all self-contained.5 But here, in the area
of geographical indications, the disagreement between the United
States and the New World countries on the one hand, and the
European Union on the other hand, was so strong during the
Uruguay Round that, at best, the parties could agree to continue to
disagree.
Although the TRIPs Agreement uses the phrase “geographical
indications” at the international level, different countries fulfill the
obligations the Agreement establishes in different ways. In
particular, there are two general paradigms for fulfilling
geographical indications obligations in the TRIPs Agreement.
The first is a system that emanates from and really originates in
France. This is a system of appellations d’origine controllées, a
centralized system of special sui generis protection, which you see
in many European Union countries.
The other system, which is mainly rooted in the United States,
but also popular in many other countries, including I think Japan
and China and Canada, protects geographical indications through
trademark law, and in particular through certification and
collection of trademarks.
So there is a very strong paradigm difference here. The
paradigm difference is rooted truly in the fact that geographical
indications are the point where intellectual property meets
agricultural policy, where geographical indications meet different
conceptions of the market versus industrial policy.

4
5

TRIPs arts. 23(4), 24(1).
TRIPs arts. 9–14, 27–38, respectively.
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What are geographical indications?
Well, geographical
indications include CHAMPAGNE and CHABLIS wine;
BOURBON and IRISH and PISCO whiskey; FETA and
ROQUEFORT cheese; KOBE beef; SWISS chocolate. As you can
see from a list like that, geographical indications—for those of us
who try to study the subject—require serious empirical research,
which takes us often to dangerous places, like Napa Valley. I am
mainly a copyright professor, but I can honestly say geographical
indications have treated me very well.
Now, we have a distinguished panel today to talk about
geographical indications. I will introduce them briefly.
First, leading off our panel is Lynne Beresford, who is the
Commissioner of Trademarks at the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office. Lynne and I have known each other for many years and—I
have to put my plug in now—Lynne is also an Adjunct Professor
on the Cardozo Law faculty. But more importantly than that, if
you just knew Lynne Beresford as the Commissioner of
Trademarks at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, you would
be badly underestimating her résumé, because Lynne is probably
one of the world’s most influential trademark experts. She was for
many years the chairperson of the World Intellectual Property
Organization’s (hereinafter WIPO) Standing Committee on
Trademarks.
Next to her is Annette Kur. We are very fortunate to have
Annette in New York this year. She is normally at the Max Planck
Institute, where she is a researcher and head of the unit at the
Institute that works on intellectual property. She also is an
Associate Professor at the University of Stockholm. Sometime I
am going to ask her about her frequent-flyer-mile account between
those gigs, Munich and Stockholm.
Next to her is Ken Plevan, who is the co-chair of the Skadden
Arps intellectual property practice. Ken, of course, needs no
introduction as an intellectual property expert. You don’t get to do
IP at Skadden Arps at all, let alone head the IP Group, unless you
are quite eminent in the field.
And finally, last but not least, is Susan Scafidi, who is here as a
Visiting Professor at Fordham Law School, but normally is a
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Professor at Southern Methodist University. Susan has written
some very, very interesting work on the relationship between
cultural issues and intellectual property, and I am sure that we will
hear from that perspective.
With that, I am going to turn it over to Lynne Beresford to start
us off with a presentation. Each of our speakers gets twelve
minutes, except for Commissioner Beresford, who gets eighteen.
[See article below in lieu of presentation transcript.]6
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Thank you, Lynne.
As you saw, I think one of the most helpful slides from
Commissioner Beresford was the three-part slide showing the
demands that the European Union has made in what was
essentially the Doha Round negotiations, three parts. Those
demands all stem from what I introduced earlier when I mentioned
that that the TRIPs Agreement is unusual, in that it calls for
continued negotiations over the protection of geographical
indications.7 So you saw the claw back list, which is forty-one
terms; the international register; and the Article 23 extension of
protection.8
Let me say a word about that to give you a little background
here. Article 22 of the TRIPs Agreement essentially affords all
geographical indications protection at the trademark level.9 The
level of protection the TRIPs Agreement affords to wines and
spirits, however—as I said earlier—is elevated, something more
6

Lynne Beresford, Geographical Indications: The Current Landscape, 17 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 979 (2007).
7
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
8
See Beresford, supra note 6, at 989.
9
TRIPs art. 22(2)(a)–(b) provides that:
In respect of geographical indications, Members shall provide the legal means
for interested parties to prevent:
(a) the use of any means in the designation or presentation of a good that
indicates or suggests that the good in question originates in a geographical area
other than the true place of origin in a manner which misleads the public as to
the geographical origin of the good;
(b) any use which constitutes an act of unfair competition within the meaning
of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967) . . .
TRIPs, supra note 1. Because article 22(a) requires that the public be “misled” by a
label, this is essentially the confusion-based standard familiar in trademark law.
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akin to an American trademark scholar’s conception of dilution
protection,10 or at least dilution protection within certain product
categories. The question is whether this heightened form of
protection should expand from protecting only wines and spirits to
covering all geographical indications—such as ROQUEFORT,
FETA, KOBE beef, and SWISS chocolate. This is the fight about
future standards.
There is also a fight about preexisting standards, which I think
Annette might speak to just a little bit, but not very much. While
the Doha Round negotiations were taking place, the United States
and Australia were suing the European Union in the World Trade
Organization (hereinafter WTO) dispute settlement system,
arguing that the European Union’s geographical indication system
does not permit, or has not to date permitted, foreigners to register
and receive the full protection of geographical indications in the
European Union.11
The Dispute Settlement Body at the WTO reached a judgment
largely in favor of the United States and Australia, but with some
important conclusions in favor of the European Union.12 The
10

TRIPs art. 23(1) eliminates the confusion requirement vis-à-vis names on wines and
spirits:
Each member shall provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent use
of a geographical indication identifying wines for wines not originating in the
place indicated by the geographical indication in question or identifying spirits
for spirits not originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication
in question, even where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the
geographical indication is used in translation or accompanied by expressions
such as “kind,” “type,” “style,” “imitation,” or the like.
TRIPs, supra note 1. This eliminates the possibility of many non-confusing labels, such
as “fake Scotch” on a scotch-like liquor or “imitation Cognac” on a fortified wine.
11
The United States initiated its case in June 1999. Request for Consultations by the
United States, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/1 (June 1, 1999). In
2003, the WTO combined the American complaint with a parallel Australian complaint
and created a panel to hear the unified complaints as one action. See Constitution of the
Panel Established at the Requests of the United States and Australia, European
Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural
Products and Foodstuffs, ¶¶ 1, 3, WT/DS290/19 (Feb. 24, 2004).
12
Panel Report, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005)
[hereinafter WTO Panel Report on Origins Regulations]. See Hughes, supra note 3, at
328–31 (discussing aspects of the WTO Panel Report on Origins Regulations).
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European Union modified its law effective earlier this year, I
believe.13 Is that correct, Annette?
DR. KUR: Yes.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: And so, while none exist yet, maybe
there will be, eleven, twelve, thirteen, or even fourteen years after
the TRIPs Agreement, some non-European geographical
indications protected under European Union law.
With that as a bridge, I would like to introduce Annette Kur,
who, as I said, is head of the Intellectual Property Research Unit at
the Max Planck Institute, an extremely influential—probably the
most influential—IP think tank in Europe. With that, Annette, take
it away.
DR. KUR: Thank you very much, Justin.
Just let me say that we may be influential in some areas, but we
definitely have nothing to do with the GI regime that has applied
to-date in Europe.
First of all, I am really very glad to be here and to be on this
panel.
I feel a bit uncomfortable, though, not because I am the only
European—and this is, of course, a very contentious area between
the U.S. and the EU—but rather on the contrary, because I agree
on far more points with Lynne than I disagree. However, being
here as a European, I think that I should make an effort to defend
the European position.
But I also have to emphasize that what appears as “the”
European position from the outside—and what is indeed adopted
and endorsed by EU representatives in international negotiations—
is not really a common European position. It is rooted in a system
well developed in individual countries, especially in France, and
also in Italy and to some extent in Spain, i.e., countries around the
Mediterranean Sea. It certainly does not come from Germany or
other countries in Northern Europe such as the United Kingdom or
the Scandinavian nations. Nowadays, it also has some support in
13

See Council Regulation 510/2006, On the Protection of Geographical Indications and
Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2006 O.J. (L 93) 12
(EC).
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the new Member countries of Eastern and Middle Europe, which
harbor their own strong agricultural traditions.
This brings me back to something that Lynne said, to which I
simply must subscribe. Is this a trade issue rather than an
intellectual property issue? Yes, it is. It is about trade policy in
the first place.
Is it about agricultural policy? Yes, it is. The legislative
initiative that lead to the regime for specific GI protection that
currently applies in the European Union was brought forward by
the agricultural department of the Commission,14 rather than the
Directorate-General for the Internal Market, which is generally
responsible for propelling intellectual property harmonization
legislation.
On all these points, I concur with Lynne’s statements.
Nevertheless, it remains true that specific protection of GIs does
form part of intellectual property law. In the end, this depends on
the exact definition of GIs, but it is important to note that Article
1(2) of the Paris Convention mentions GIs as one of the fields
industrial property protection covers.15 In addition, as we have
heard, TRIPs also explicitly addresses GIs.16
Therefore,
technically, there is no way of denying that GIs count as a specific
area of intellectual property law.
Next question: are GIs the same as trademarks? I had the
impression that Lynne’s statements to some extent endorsed this
conclusion. Here again, I have some reservations. In my opinion,
there are some differences between GIs in a general sense and
trademarks. The most notable of these differences is that
trademarks belong to one individual trademark holder and laws
normally consider them transferable property. GIs, on the other
hand, are inherently collective, and not just in the sense that
collective entities own certification marks or collective marks.
14

The Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development.
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Stockholm Act of July 14,
1967, art. 1(2), 828 U.N.T.S. 307 (“The protection of industrial property has as its object
patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names,
indications of source or appellations of origin, and the repression of unfair
competition.”).
16
TRIPs, supra note 1, arts. 22–24.
15
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Irrespective of the establishment of specific associations for
registering GI, GIs exist by themselves, wherever and whenever
signs make reference to products originating from certain regions.
At least in this sense, GIs differ from, and go beyond, the
trademark system. They are rather part of a general regime of
protection against misrepresentation. The international community
adopted this type of protection as the basic rule underlying Article
22 of TRIPs.17
I therefore submit that we should acknowledge that there are
certain merits in a GI protection regime that is not exactly the same
as a trademark protection scheme. Registration and assignment of
a sign to an individual rights holder is not integral to GI protection.
GI protection is rather a collective right that exists independently,
simply because the public assumes that specific products come
from certain regions, and thus ascribes the qualities of such
products to such regions. This is the basic concept.
The question, then, is this: can or should the law impose
additional protection regimes on top of this basic concept, and if
so, what form should such enhanced regimes take?
First, I should clarify that protection by way of certification
marks is an excellent way of granting additional protection to GIs.
This option exists in both the United States, and Europe. Lynne
said it already, but let me emphasize this point here again: in the
EU, we do not just protect GIs with a sui generis system; we also
provide for protection with certification marks.
But indeed, in addition to that, European law has adopted a
specific system for GI protection: the GI Regulation (hereinafter
GI-R). The printed material for this conference included the text

17
See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22(1) (“Geographical indications are, for the purposes
of this Agreement, indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a
Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”); see also
TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22(2)(b) (referencing article 10bis of the Paris Convention, the
general clause-like prohibition against unfair competition).
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of an amended version of the GI-R that went into effect earlier this
year.18
Scholars can criticize the type of protection the GI-R
established from a number of directions. For one, the regulation is
extremely complicated and formal. It also restricts competition,19
as well as the ability to use GIs in commercial speech,20 to a degree
so extensive that might it appear quite precarious. On the other
hand, there is no denying that it may produce, in principle,
beneficial effects in the agricultural sector, which would vary in
import amongst the individual countries of the EU. As was stated
above, it was these benefits to agricultural industries that
precipitated the introduction of the GI-R.
Ultimately, however, we must leave the problems the GI-R
created for the Europeans to sort out among themselves. If this is
the sort of regime a majority of the EU countries wants to establish
as a Community rule, who is to criticize them? As long as the GIR scheme only implicates the regulation of EU-internal matters,
the EU is surely free to do what it wants.
However—and this is another point where I have to concur
with what Lynne has pointed out21—when the EU imposes such a
regime as a specific category of intellectual property law falling
under the ambit of TRIPs, there is an obligation under international
law to make such protections accessible to nationals from all
countries subscribing to TRIPs. It is not permissible to create a
regime the protections of which only citizens of certain favored
18

Council Regulation 510/06, On the Protection of Geographical Indications and
Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2006 O.J. (L 93) 12
(EC).
19
See, e.g., Case C-108/01, Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma & Salumificio S. Rita
SpA v. Asda Stores Ltd. & Hygrade Foods Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-5121, I-5194–95
(proscribing the slicing and packaging of ham marketed under the GI-protected term
“Prosciutto di Parma” beyond the confines of the Italian region of Parma, the only region
authiorized to produce hams bearing such a name); Case C-469/00, Ravil S.A.R.L. v.
Bellon Imp. S.A.R.L., 2003 E.C.R. I-5053, I-5119 (barring the grating of cheese sold
under the GI-protected name “Grana Padano” outside of the Italian regions authorized to
produce such cheese).
20
Council Regulation 510/2006, On the Protection of Geographical Indications and
Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, art. 13, 2006 O.J. (L 93)
12, 19 (EC).
21
See Beresford, supra note 6, at 997.
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countries may enjoy, and this is precisely what other TRIPs
member countries have accused the EU of doing.
The issue has been the object of WTO dispute settlement
proceedings. The panel report that arose from these proceedings
criticized the EU for trying to impose a system that, while claiming
to be accessible to everyone, was actually exclusive in that it made
it practically impossible for individuals from countries outside the
EU to obtain protection under the GI-R unless such individuals’
home countries employed regulatory schemes analogous to the GIR.22 In practice, the EU effectively forced other countries to
establish systems for orchestrating the certification and monitoring
of GIs analogous to the EU system as a precondition of registration
under the GI-R. The WTO Panel found that this action on the part
of the EU clashed with the principle of national treatment.23
As was said before, the EU recently amended this system in
response to the WTO Panel report.24 At least on paper, the
European Union has introduced changes that make it possible for
stakeholders from non-EU countries to apply to register GIs in the
EU without pre-examination or regular monitoring of the GI
protection regimes in such individuals countries of origin. I cannot
say how this has worked out in practice, I am not an expert on that,
and in addition, the amendments are quite recent. Perhaps we need
more time in order to see whether anything comes out of these
changes, at least with respect to whether the EU will now, and in
the future, accept American GIs for registration in Europe.25
Of course, in practice, any changes hinge upon American
producers actively pursuing applications under this system. People
dealing with these issues in the European Union have told me that
22

WTO Panel Report on Origins Regulations, supra note 12, ¶¶ 7.72, .74, .102.
See id.
24
See Council Regulation 510/2006, On the Protection of Geographical Indications and
Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2006 O.J. (L 93) 12
(EC).
25
While the EU had not registered any non-EU geographical indications as of the time
of this Panel, by spring 2007 Brussels appeared to be moving to registered its first few
non-EU GIs, including “Napa.” Paul Franson, More wine regions join push for place
protection, ST. HELENA STAR (Cal.), Apr. 5, 2007 (reporting that “the European Union
recently announced that Napa Valley has been named a Geographical Indication, the first
wine region in North America to gain the protection and recognition of this designation”).
23
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lack of interest is indeed the main reason why there is so little
movement regarding GI protection of American designations of
origin in Europe. They told me instead that all Americans really
want to see is that the certification mark system applies in the
European Union in exactly the same manner that it applies in the
United States.
Contrary to that, Lynne told me just before we started that
American producers are genuinely interested in gaining access to
GI protection in Europe. Again, I am not expert enough to judge.
I can only hope that the changes the EU made to the GI-R in the
wake of the WTO Panel report have improved the legal situation
enough to rule out any discriminatory effects that would clash with
international obligations.
Let me now use the very last minute of my time for another
topic Lynne addressed in her presentation: the question of whether
and in what manner the global community should extend the
regime of international GI protection. Should it, for instance,
introduce a registration system modeled on the system that
presently applies in the EU? Should it expand Article 23 of
TRIPs26 so that it grants absolute protection—irrespective of the
likelihood of consumer confusion regarding geographical origin—
to GIs for all types of products? Like Lynne, I can only caution
against the introduction of such systems, which would create chaos
and simply prove unmanageable.
As an illustration of this point, it is of note that before the last
session of the WIPO Standing Committee on Trademarks,
Geographical Indications, and Industrial Designs convened in
November, 2006, the Permanent Mission of Brazil in Geneva
communicated a list of some 5,000 indications of indigenous plant
names that it maintained should be excluded from trademark

26

TRIPs art. 23(1) (“Each Member shall provide the legal means for interested parties
to prevent use of a geographical indication identifying wines for wines not originating in
the place indicated by the geographical indication in question or identifying spirits for
spirits not originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication in question,
even where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the geographical indication is used
in translation or accompanied by expressions such as ‘kind’, ‘type’, ‘style’, ‘imitation’ or
the like.”).
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protection.27 Although these plant names are not exactly the same
as GIs, this move on the part of Brazil goes in the same direction
as would a regulation exempting all sorts of national GIs from
worldwide trademark protection. To establish such a system on an
internationally mandatory basis would simply be crazy.
Again, in this regard I find no argument in defense of the
official European position. In my view, it is clear to see that such a
position is not going to benefit anyone.
As my last point, I want to emphasize that my last statement
also pertains to developing countries. The EU sometimes
advertises its position as a tool for promoting the development
agenda because GIs offer a good way of protecting—at least in an
indirect manner—traditional knowledge extant in developing
countries by granting the exclusive right to use the names of
regions from which traditionally manufactured products
historically originate in commerce only to such regions. I think
that the argument is inherently flawed. If—as in the case of the
Brazilian plant variety list mentioned before—this would lead to
countries communicating to one other, and claiming exclusive
protection of a huge number of such designations—who can
seriously believe that anyone will actually derive substantial profit
from such practices? The most likely results are merely the
creation of additional impediments for trademark protection and,
ultimately, chaos. Thus, I really do not think that this is a tenable
position.28
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Thank you, Annette.
One thing that happens in a panel like this is that since
everyone is so expert, we often may not be explaining everything
that is going on in our heads as we go on. So let me try to fill in a
little bit on some things.

27
World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Communication from the
Permanent Mission of Brazil, at 2, WIPO doc. SCT/16/7 (Sept. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_16/sct_16_7.pdf.
28
See Annette Kur & Sam Cocks, Nothing but a GI Thing: Geographical Indications
under EU Law, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 999 (2007) (companion
piece to Dr. Kur’s presentation).
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What Lynne and Annette refer to as the European law, we
commonly call the “Origins Regulation.”29 The case that Australia
and the United States brought against the European Union on the
Origins Regulation had a couple of different and distinct claims.
Originally—as Annette correctly described it—one of the main
claims was that the EU system required a country to have a
parallel, equally strong geographical indications appellation system
as a precondition of EU registration.30 So, obviously, the United
States was not eligible; Jamaica was not eligible; lots of countries
were not eligible, particularly in the New World.
There were also procedural hurdles in the Origins Regulation
that made it simply impossible for Jamaicans, Colombians, Sri
Lankans, or Americans to apply, because as the EU originally
drafted the Origins Regulation, it required that a European Union
member government present an application for registration.31 Of
course, if you are a Sri Lankan, you do not have a European Union
member government to present your application.
So there were many problems with the Origins Regulation.
Perhaps the recent amendments have ameliorated these issues, but
it is too soon to know with any certainty.
Annette is completely correct in stating that European Union
countries also have certification mark systems. One vast problem
that the EU member countries have failed to work out amongst
themselves is the relationship between geographical indication
protection at the EU level and certification mark protection in
different countries. I know Lionel Bentley at Oxford has written
about this, for example.32

29
Council Regulation 2081/92, On the Protection of Geographical Indications and
Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 1992 O.J. (L 208) 1
(EC), superseded by Council Regulation 510/2006, On the Protection of Geographical
Indications and Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2006
O.J. (L 93) 12 (EC).
30
See WTO Panel Report on Origins Regulations, supra note 12, ¶ 7.38; Hughes, supra
note 3, at 328.
31
See Hughes, supra note 3, at 326.
32
Lionel Bentley & Brad Sherman, The Impact of European Geographical Indications
on National Rights in Member States, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 850 (2006).
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Now, finally, everyone has been talking about this Article 23.33
You need to understand the difference Annette was talking about
between Article 2234 and Article 23. Article 22 states that
countries are required to protect geographical indications at a
confusion standard—a likelihood of confusion, or deception
standard—familiar to any trademark law practitioner in any
country.35 Article 23 affords wines and spirits an additional nonconfusion-based standard of protection, a kind of protection that
you might think of as a dilution standard of protection—French
law describes it as usurpation protection—that protects the mark
against any usurpation by anyone else.36 This obviously is an
extremely strong kind of protection.
I make that kind of introduction because our next speaker, Ken
Plevan, who, as I said, is one of the co-heads of the IP practice at
Skadden Arps—and I failed to mention he is also an adjunct
faculty member here at Fordham where he teaches advanced
trademark law, so this is really an all-professor panel here—is of
the view that the law protects trademarks and GIs against dilution
too stridently, and at the expense of free expression. With that, I
would like to turn it over to Ken.
MR. PLEVAN: Thank you.

33

TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 23.
Id. art. 22.
35
See id. art. 22(3).
36
Article 3 of the Lisbon Agreement, the multilateral agreement dedicated to
geographical indications in general, expressly mentions the “usurpation” standard. See
Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International
Registration, art. 3, Oct. 31, 1958, 923 U.N.T.S. 197 [hereinafter Lisbon Agreement]. In
the TRIPs negotiations, the EU originally proposed this standard for all geographical
indications. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 318–19. The French “usurpation” standard for
the protection of geographical indications stems from article L. 115-5 of the Code de la
Consommation. See C. CON. art. L. 115-5 (FR.) (“[L]e nom qui constitue l’appellation
d’origine . . . ne peuvent être employés pour aucun produit similaire. . . . Ils ne peuvent
être employés pour aucun établissement et aucun autre produit ou service, lorsque cette
utilisation est susceptible de détourner ou d’affaiblir la notoriété d’appellation
d’origine.”) [The name that constitutes the appellation d’origine cannot be used for any
similar product. They cannot be used for establishment or any other product or service,
when this use is likely to divert from or weaken the reputation of the appellation
d’origine.].
34
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Professor Hughes commented before about the problems you
encounter when you have a panel where everyone is an expert, so I
want to take a different approach today and explain first why I
actually know nothing about these topics.
When Hugh Hansen called me and left a message, I thought he
said he wanted me to speak on geographical limitations, i.e.
territorial restrictions, which is a field I know something about, so
it came as quite a surprise when I found out today’s topic was
geographical indications, which I knew nothing about. I tried to
get my partner to handle the presentation, and that is why my name
is not in the program. Yesterday he told me he was too busy to do
it. I think it is useful on every panel to have one speaker who
knows nothing about the topic, to try to give a fresh approach to it.
Now, regarding my qualifications on this topic, I did not know
what that raisin symbol stood for, I did not know until yesterday
that popular deli meat had anything to do with a place in Italy, and
I certainly did not know that parmesan cheese had something to do
with the region of Parma in Italy. I am not, however, afraid to
pronounce “Montepulciano” in a public audience.
I also remember—and this is accurate—when I was first old
enough to eat in a restaurant—and these were not, believe me,
fancy restaurants, this would have been in the early-to-mid1960s—that I used to go in and ask for Roquefort dressing on my
salad. Even in those inexpensive places I was dining in at the time,
the menus all changed over a period from the late-1950s to the
mid-1960s. So “Roquefort” disappeared and the term “bleu
cheese” replaced it. Even the waiter or waitress, the person who
was serving me, if I said “Roquefort dressing,” they would say
“bleu cheese.”
So now I open it up so you all can decide whether or not we are
worse off for that or better off for that. But we certainly at that
time got used to the fact that ROQUEFORT, as I learned this
morning, is a registered mark, so you can’t describe a dressing as
Roquefort unless the bleu cheese in it comes from the appropriate
region in France.
What I wanted to talk about this morning at least for some of
my time—as Professor Hughes indicated—is the question of

PANEL_II_FINAL_050807

2007

5/8/2007 1:00:31 PM

GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS

949

whether if we were to apply that higher standard, the property
rights standard, for wine and spirits in the United States, whether
that would qualify, or pass muster, under the First Amendment.37
So what I am really talking about is not trademarks, but rather the
matter of genericness.38
What it seems to me that this would do is take words and
phrases or descriptions, geographical indications that are already
generic, and considered so by consumers in the United States,
remove them from this category, and give them some kind of a
property right.
Historically, there is very little interface between trademark
law and First Amendment law. I have been listening carefully.
Commissioner Beresford did not mention the First Amendment at
all in her presentation. So why not? Why is the First Amendment
unimportant in the context of trademark law?
The main reason is that trademark infringement requires
deceptive or misleading speech,39 and what we are talking about
today is a property right that does not inherently contain deception.
This is what Judge Kozinski, in the Mattel Barbie Doll case,
referred to as “the First Amendment compass of trademark law;”40
the compass that inherently keeps trademark law away from First
Amendment problems, because of the requirement that you must
have a likelihood of confusion in order to prevail in an
infringement case.41
Now, there are some other buffers. One, of course, is the
genericness exception. Generic marks are not trademarks, and thus
do not fall under the ambit of trademark protection.42
The third buffer is the fair use doctrine.

37

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See, e.g., 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 12:1 (4th ed. 2007) (addressing genericness).
39
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (“making actionable the deceptive and misleading
use of marks in [] commerce”).
40
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002).
41
See id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
42
See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 38, § 12:1.
38
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So what law would apply? Well, the law that you would apply
to this heightened property right would presumably be the test that
the Supreme Court set down in the Central Hudson case,43 which
is still good law. Central Hudson is the test you apply if the
government is trying to proscribe commercial speech that is not
deceptive, but truthful.44 The government must have a substantial
interest, the regulation must directly advance the government’s
stated interests, and it cannot be more extensive than necessary to
serve this interest.45
As far as some case law, there is the case of San Francisco Arts
and Athletic, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Committee.46 In this case, a
group in San Francisco decided that they were going to hold the
Gay Olympics.47 Statutory law states that the U.S. Olympic
Committee has the exclusive right to use the Olympic symbol and
the word “Olympics,” I believe, for all commercial purposes,48 so
the U.S. Olympic Committee sued and obtained an injunction
against this group in San Francisco.49 This was back in the mid1980s.
The Supreme Court heard the case in 1987.50 In a series of
opinions, meaning the court split 5-2-2—there were two
concurring and dissenting opinions—the Court upheld the statutory
restriction on use of the Olympic symbol and the word Olympics.51
The Court examined the rationale behind Congress’ decision to
protect the Olympics and held it to be valid.52
Now, this was not a perfect Central Hudson case in that the
Court did not fully apply the Central Hudson analysis, because
there was at least a comment in the majority opinion that use of the
term Olympics in the “Gay Olympics” might cause consumer

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. 557.
Id. at 564.
Id.
483 U.S. 522 (1987).
Id. at 525.
36 U.S.C. § 220506 (2000).
San Francisco Arts, 447 U.S. at 527.
Id. at 522.
Id. at 548.
Id. at 532–35.
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confusion.53 The Court did construe the statute as proscribing
truthful, non-confusing speech, but it also found that the
proscriptions the statute established protected a substantial
governmental interest.54
There is also the somewhat older case of Friedman v. Rogers,
which involved regulations on optometrists in Texas.55 Texas law
proscribed the practice of optometry unless you used your own
personal name.56 You could not use a business name, like “North
Houston Optometrists.” The Supreme Court suggested in this case
that trademarks are a lower form of commercial speech because in
contrast to other forms of commercial speech that provide
information about price, quality and the like, trademarks “have no
intrinsic meaning.”57
With this background, I still question very much whether in
today’s climate the Supreme Court would find that Congress has a
proper governmental interest in protecting wine growers in foreign
countries under American law. I think it would be very difficult
for the Court to uphold such legislation under the weight of a
serious First Amendment challenge.
Importers certainly can put down on their parmesan cheese
where it came from, and they can say “this is true, genuine,
Parmigiano Reggiano cheese, made in the Parma region of Italy.”
So there are other ways of identifying such products. And,
presumably, the many Americans willing to pay the extra twenty to
thirty percent for the better quality of authentic regional products
would be able to figure this out. For those, frankly, who do not
care about quality and authenticity, why should they pay this price
premium?
The analogy is, of course, the federal dilution statute.58 First,
we could say: are American trademark holders and the Patent and
Trademark Office great defenders of the First Amendment? Well,
probably not. It is probably really more of an economic thing. We
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id. at 539.
Id. at 536–39.
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 3 (1979).
Id.
Id. at 12.
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
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know that from the federal dilution statute, because the owners of
the most powerful trademarks in the world lobbied Congress to
enact the statute. What did these powerful trademark owners want
the dilution statute to protect? I suggest they wanted it to protect
the sensibilities of vice presidents of marketing at powerful
companies who are somehow offended when someone else uses
their company’s trademarks without actually causing confusion.
Now, is that a substantial government interest? It probably is to a
Republican Congress. I wonder whether the Congress in office
today would have passed the dilution statute if the bill were up for
vote today.
I personally think that the dilution laws are of dubious
constitutionality. I hope that someday the Patent and Trademark
Office will concur, and withdraw their regulations that try to adopt
references to dilution in the registration process.
But, obviously, the First Amendment is a very particular U.S.
phenomenon. It does not, as I understand it—I may be wrong—
apply in the rest of the world. So Americans do approach these
sorts of problems differently than do Europeans.
It is a bit like the territorial restriction, in that what is right in
the United States is not necessarily right in Europe. One of the
reasons for this is that European consumers have a different view
on these things than American consumers.
Like the great example of the dispute between Budweiser and
Budvar that has been going on for years in Europe.59 It would be
very difficult, I think, to convince many American beer drinkers—
who, but for this legal dispute, would probably have no knowledge
of the fact that Budvar is a province in the Czech Republic
historically renowned for centuries for making beer—that there is
confusion over these two beer-related terms in parts of Europe, for
there is certainly no confusion in the United States.
So I defer to everyone else on the panel to figure out how we
harmonize two clashing interests, where everything works fine
59

See generally Hughes, supra note 3, at 329–30 (noting the nature of the ongoing
dispute between Anheuser-Busch, owner of the Budweiser brand of beer, and the Czech
town of Budvar, a historical beer-brewing locale, and the lack of any palpable resolution
to this matter).
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here in the United States; and, on the other hand, legitimate
interests may well exist—particularly at that lower level of
protection in the context of deception—because European
consumers have different reactions than American consumers.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Thank you.
Well, a “clash of interests” set things up appropriately for
Susan, because in addition to being a Visiting Professor here at
Fordham and a Professor at Southern Methodist University’s Law
School, Susan is also the author of a book entitled Who Owns
Culture? Appropriation and Authenticity in American Law,60 so
she has spent a huge amount of time thinking about issues of free
expression and free markets versus identity and identity politics
and a sense of belonging as well as a sense of ownership in
cultures. So I think it is excellent to have Susan bringing this
together for us as a wrap-up speaker.
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: Thanks, Justin.
Thank you so much, Hugh, for inviting me to speak, and to
members of the IP Law Journal for organizing this event.
When Justin mentioned that he was speaking on GIs, people
asked him about his health. When I mentioned the same thing to a
colleague, he said, “Oh, we’ll never get them out of Iraq.” So
there is much confusion over exactly what we are talking about
today, but I can assure you I will do my best to stay on topic.
I am speaking today about the relationship between
geographical indications and cultural property, particularly
intangible cultural property. Justin was kind enough to mention
the book Who Owns Culture?, in which I substitute the term
“cultural products” for “intangible cultural property,” because it is
shorter to type, and also emphasizes the ongoing nature of cultural
production in the form of things like cuisine, dance, dress, music,
and traditional medicine.61

60

SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE? APPROPRIATION
AMERICAN LAW (2005).
61
Id. at ix–x.

AND

AUTHENTICITY

IN

PANEL_II_FINAL_050807

954

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

5/8/2007 1:00:31 PM

Vol. 17:933

With this juxtaposition between GIs and cultural products in
mind, I would like to turn back to a discussion of the categories of
GIs. Under TRIPs, there are two different levels of protection for
two different types of GIs: wines and spirits, on the one hand, and
a second category labeled, “other.”62 I believe it is possible to
subdivide further the category of “other.”
One could find all the examples of GIs the panel has offered
today on the menu at a nice cocktail party—wine, cheeses—and
Justin happily mentioned chocolate, which I was pleased to hear.
In other words, all of the common examples used in the EU-U.S.
debate on geographical indications are comestible, whether in the
form of alcoholic beverages, or food and agricultural products.
The definition of GIs, however, is comprehensive enough to
encompass not only food and drink, but also other categories of
local creativity. In particular, it can include articles of manufacture
or handicrafts. Although articles of manufacture that qualify for
protection as GIs exist in Europe—Swiss watches or Turkish
carpets, for example—they have particular significance in the
developing world. In the interest of broadening this panel beyond
the concerns of the global North, it is important to focus on
handicrafts as well as food and drink.
Now, as you know, the TRIPs Agreement describes rights that
are negative, rather than affirmative. While TRIPs mandates that
subscribing nations provide legal means of preventing misleading
uses, it does not require member countries to provide for
registration of GIs as a separate protected category. Each country
may choose to fulfill its TRIPs obligation either by creating a
specific registry for GIs, or by simply incorporating them within a
system of trademarks and preventing misleading registrations, as
Lynne said.63 TRIPs provides greater protection for wine and
spirits, barring not only use of inaccurate designations, but also use
of such designations alongside words like “style,” “type” or “kind”
that could foster confusion.64

62
63
64

See TRIPs, supra note 1, arts. 22–23.
Id. art. 22(2).
Id. art. 23(1).
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In order to understand fully the scope of GI protection in the
TRIPs Agreement, it is necessary to go beyond the definitions and
requirements in TRIPs and compare them with some other
definitions. TRIPs’ definition of GIs, of course, requires that a
protected good have “a given quality, reputation, or other
characteristic [that] is essentially attributable to its geographic
origin.”65 In other words, the TRIPs requirements are stricter than
mere indication of source.
TRIPs, however, is somewhat less specific in this regard than
its predecessor treaty on appellations of origins, the 1958 Lisbon
Agreement, which requires that the quality and characteristics of a
good be “due exclusively or essentially to the geographical
environment, including natural and human factors.”66 Membership
in the Lisbon Agreement has always been somewhat limited;
membership was originally a European consortium joined inter
alia by Mexico, an interesting example to which we will return
shortly.67
Given my role as a scholar of culture, I am particularly
interested in the human factors that are part of the geography
mentioned in Lisbon, and might arguably be implicit in TRIPs as
well. I would argue that they are most relevant to the third
category I suggested to you within GIs, articles of manufacture or
handicrafts.
Surely, when we focus on wine and spirits, the knowledge and
experience of the winemaker is important. Perhaps this is less so
when we are talking about a farmer growing VIDALIA onions—I
don’t know how much specific human knowledge and skill that
involves as compared with growing generic onions, but then, I’m
not an onion farmer. When we focus on handicrafts, however, the
input of the artisans is arguably more important than the input of
things like climate, and other aspects that, if we were discussing
wine, we would call the terroir. The category of handicrafts is the
one that most overlaps with the things that I have studied in the
65

Id. art. 22(1).
Lisbon Agreement, supra note 36, art. 2.
67
For a list of nations currently adhering to the Lisbon Agreement, see WIPO,
Members of WIPO Bodies, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&
search_what=B&bo_id=11 (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
66
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realm of intangible cultural property, and so I will focus on this
category for the rest of my time.
Lynne has already noted the relationship between the function
of trademarks and the function of GIs, as has Annette. I would add
that geographical indications, or at least appellations of origin, also
serve a purpose related to what I have called “authenticity marks”
in other work, the kinds of marks that may take the form of
collective marks but whose most important role is to allow a
cultural group to establish a formal relationship between the
community at large and the goods or cultural products that such a
group creates.
Annette also noted that communal nature is an important
attribute of GIs. From this perspective, I believe that GIs serve an
attributional function by allowing communities to capture the
additional economic value of authenticity, something like what
Ken described, rather than just a grant of economic monopoly. For
example, everyone can join the winemakers of Champagne in
making champagne, but the rest of us just have to call it “sparkling
wine.” GIs are not a limit on actual creation of these goods, but
rather mere a constraint on nomenclature.
Some examples of legal attempts to facilitate the use of
communal marks or attributive marks outside of the GI context
include things like the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990,68 as
well as similar public-private efforts to protect the Maori in New
Zealand69 and aboriginal peoples in Australia, although in
Australia the particular mark is no longer active.70
The difference, then, between geographical indications and
other kinds of authenticity marks or attributional marks is that the
latter focus on membership in cultural groups rather than on
68

Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1159 & 25 U.S.C. §§ 305, 305d, 305e (2000)).
69
For information about the “Maori Made” mark, see Creative New Zealand Arts
Council of New Zealand Toi Aotearoa, The Toi Iho Maori Made Mark,
http://www.creativenz.govt.nz/funding/other/toi_iho.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
70
For information about the Australian National Indigenous Arts Advocacy
Association’s former label of authenticity program, see Arts Centre of Australia Online,
Certificate of Authenticity, http://www.artslaw.com.au/LegalInformation/Indigenous/
Certificate%20of%20Authenticity.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
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physical or geographical location, although in the case of many
indigenous groups or local groups there is substantial overlap
between the two. In other words, the categories of familial
relationship and physical location can be roughly coextensive.
Of course, focus on membership has its own problems. Who is
a member of a Native American nation? Who has the right blood
lines? Who has lived in an area long enough to be part of the
community? This set of issues, however, does not arise in the
context of geographical indications.
Human migration, of course, makes establishing the
relationship between human artisans and geographical indications
much more complicated. One of the typical U.S. objections to
protection of GIs that Lynne did not mention is the issue of
emigrants, people who leave their countries—artisans who leave
their countries in the current example—who wish to continue their
work elsewhere. This phenomenon informs the Old World/New
World debate that persists in the international dialogue regarding
GIs, as compared with the usual global North/South debate that
exists in other areas of IP law.
In my view, the reality of emigration is an issue that the law
must address in the context of GI protection for articles of
manufacture and handicrafts. How should the legal system treat a
craftsperson who leaves his or her country and wishes to continue
producing an artisanal good elsewhere and referring to it by its
traditional name? This is an important concern, and one to which
we shall return shortly.
First, however, let us consider the question of why we bother to
protect these products at all, especially when we are talking about
handicrafts. Well, I think that Annette disposed of one argument a
little too quickly perhaps: the idea that this sort of thing can benefit
economies and groups of individuals who produce less high-tech
IP—in other words, the developing world. Okay, if Brazil tries to
register 5,000 different names, this may be a bit much, but I think
that when we discuss support for microenterprise, these kinds of
GIs, or attributional marks of some sort, can be important. Allow
me to concretize this type of initiative briefly.
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I mentioned that Mexico was a member of the old Lisbon
Agreement. One of the more interesting aspects of Mexico’s
participation is that has consistently maintained, alongside
TEQUILA and AGAVE, registrations for categories of regional
handicraft. Specifically, Mexico protects TALAVERA, a kind of
intricate lacquer work often seen on wooden trays and boxes, and
OLINALA, a type of pottery.
India is an example of a country that has more recently turned
to GIs to protect regional handicrafts under a recently adopted
Geographical Indications Act.71 Last week, India reported that it
now has twenty-eight registered GIs.72 I reviewed this list.
Approximately three-quarters of these GIs are handicrafts of some
sort, including many textiles; none of them are wines or spirits.73
You saw DARJEELING tea among the panel’s earlier examples; it
is one of the agricultural products on the Indian list. The vast
majority, however, are handicrafts. It has become important to
development in rural areas of India to focus on artisans, and GIs
may be a way to help them promote their work. A wonderful news
report about India’s National Institute of Fashion Technology and
its project to send students to aid the rural poor in attempting to
market their handicrafts underscores this point.74 Although
registering a GI is no guarantee that economic benefit will ensue,
the additional benefit of a recognized name—a geographical
indication safeguarded against misappropriation—at least has the
potential to avert exploitation of traditional names by outsiders.
In the context of the global South, the economic potential of
GIs offers the possibility of balancing the substantial benefits of
the IP system the global North has reaped, even if to date European
nations have been in the best position to develop GI-protected
71
The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999,
No. 48, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India), available at http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/
ipr/gi/gi_act.PDF.
72
28 Products Registered as Geographical Indications, INDLAW NEWS, Nov. 9, 2006,
http://indlaw.com/guest/news/viewnewsDetail.asp?NewsID=1a2edd6ded7684284b51578
56327346e.xml (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
73
See id.
74
Jyoti Verma, Giving Craft a Touch of Fashion, FINANCIAL EXPRESS, Oct. 15, 2006,
http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=143468 (last visited Apr.
10, 2007).

PANEL_II_FINAL_050807

2007

5/8/2007 1:00:31 PM

GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS

959

resources. Once again, I must emphasize that GIs neither halt
borrowing nor stop cultural interchange; they simply give
additional weight to authenticity. Translated into economic
engines, the creative industries GIs protect can help preserve
community structures and foster the kind of pride and recognition
of community authorship that starts to sound a bit like the moral
right of attribution in the civil law copyright system.75
Given these benefits of GIs, and the fact that again cultural
interchange can still occur—but without appropriation of labels—I
tend to lean in favor of some of these protections. As I mentioned,
however, the plight of the emigrant artisan concerns me. I would
thus add a proposal, perhaps thinking far into the future, to modify
GI protection for handicrafts only, in recognition of the fact that
they rely more on human input than on literal geography.
I suggest that in the case of emigrants who are pressured or
perhaps forced to leave their homelands—whether for political,
religious, or economic reasons—if they were artisans back home,
they should have a limited right to continue using the geographical
indication of the place they left, provided they also list the actual
place of production of their goods. This formulation already falls
within the parameters of the TRIPs Agreement, as long as it is not
misleading.76 In other words, a first-generation Cuban émigré
could produce the “Down with Castro” brand of Cuban cigars,
made in the Dominican Republic.
This proposal would give such labeling a presumption of
reasonableness—a presumption that the labeling is not misleading
under the circumstances described—as an additional benefit. I
would also argue, however, that Cuban cigars made in the
Dominican Republic should have a limited lifespan. In other
words, measures to address the problem of forced emigration and
the issues that impact heavily on human beings and their GIs
should expire after a limited period, perhaps the longer of the life
of the particular émigré or a fixed term of years.
75

See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act of
July 24, 1971 (as amended on Sept. 28, 1979), art. 6bis, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 828
U.N.T.S. 221.
76
See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22(3) (prohibiting the use of geographical designations
that mislead the public).
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Certain geographic locations and their unique physical and
cultural characteristics play an important role in the production of
goods, a category not limited to food and drink. If we are to reach
international agreement on a system for recognizing GIs, we must
not simply engage in a U.S.-EU debate over agricultural products
and trade policy. Instead, we must also attempt to balance the
often-ignored human factors that are part of local production,
especially in the context of handicrafts, with the desire to literally
“spread the wealth” across the globe—and concurrently address
our equitable concerns about whether the law should recognize GIs
at all.
With six seconds left, thank you very much.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: You timed yourself perfectly. You
actually seem to have practiced that. Professors rarely have that
amount of precision in the timing of their talks.
We have forty minutes for questions and answers and
discussion. I am certainly happy to lead it off, taking the
moderator’s prerogative, but I would really like to turn to the floor
and ask people to ask their own questions, about things they did
not understand in our presentations—clarification of the actual
legal situation or political situation—as well as policy questions
and policy debate issues.
Annette?
DR. KUR: I do not want anyone to misconstrue my statement
at the end of my presentation that was maybe a bit too brief. I do
believe that providing for a system—preferably of the certification
mark type—of designations reserved for and monitored by local
groups of artisans is an excellent way to promote traditional skills.
I am not at all opposed to that.
I was arguing against the theory that indigenous communities
would automatically profit from an extension of the GI protections
Article 23 of TRIPs currently affords to wines and spirits77 to all
sorts of products. Such claims are wrong. A type of protection
that goes in the direction of a certification mark regime would
better serve the relevant objectives.
77

See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 23.
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It is also important to note in this context that the registration
of signs as such is not sufficient. Individuals often forget this in
discussions. The vital thing is to realize that marketing power
must back GIs to make them an effective tool in commerce.
Lawmakers often promise indigenous societies that once protection
for their designations is secured, everything will work out fine—
that they will find themselves in the same enviable, and profitable,
position as the makers of “Champagne.” This is of course not
true. The owners of GIs first need to make the world aware of
their existence, and of the unique qualities of their products. This
requires substantial marketing efforts directed towards countries
where customers might be willing to spend extra money on such
products.
These aspects of course do not automatically apply in a system
that simply confers worldwide protection on thousands of national
designations. That was my only point.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: I think that is an excellent point. The
European Commission selling the idea that “you register this and
you will be as rich as the champagne growers” to developing
countries has bothered me as well.
Of course, not to completely besmirch the European
Commission, there is a natural tendency of lawmakers and
bureaucrats, and probably professors, to confuse the piling-up of
laws with the piling-up of capital. There is a tendency to sell the
piling-up of additional IP protection as a way to build up
reputational capital, but as Annette said, the real issue is
developing the reputational capital.
Those of you who read the New York Times devoutly, in the
past saw a story about Rwandan coffee.78 Rwandan coffee has in
the past twenty-four or thirty-six months built up tremendous
reputational capital, with no additional legal protection. I do not
even know if they have a certification mark in the United States.
These growers are perhaps doing it with common-law certification
mark protection, so that is a very fair point.

78

at 1.

Laura Fraser, Coffee, and Hope, Grow in Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2006, § 3,
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Yes, sir?
QUESTION: I am Zhang Naigen [phonetic] from Shanghai,
China. I am the Director of the Intellectual Property Center at
Fudan University.
I have a question for both the Commissioner and the professor
from Munich regarding national treatment, in particular in the
context of GIs because this is the critical issue before the panel. I
am wondering how to apply national treatment to GIs registered at
the EU level, because the European Union is not a nation; it is a
regional organization. So how do you apply national treatment to
GI registration at the EU level? This is a question for both the
Commissioner and the professor from Munich. Thank you.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: The question was, because the
European Union is a supernational entity, how does national
treatment law apply in the context of GIs?
I think that the answer to that is rather straightforward. Go
ahead.
DR. KUR: The European Union has acceded to TRIPs, and
TRIPs imposes national treatment.79 Therefore, the Community
legislature must abide by the provisions of laws enacted at the
Community level. I do not think anyone would doubt that.
QUESTIONER:
But
the
[inaudible—off-microphone]
indicated that the EC emphasized that it is not [inaudible] the
TRIPs Agreement. So I am wondering why the emphasis is on the
EC or the EU; because for the WTO it is not EU, it is the EC, not a
separate territory. That is an argument from the EC. For this case,
I think—because the Commissioner mentioned that as of now,
there is no registration of foreign GIs in the European Union—that
is the fact. Even for Chinese exporters, for example, their goods
originated in China, not in the EC territory, so these are political
issues. I would like, in particular, for the Commissioner from the
United States to address how to apply for national treatment.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: First of all, as a matter of simple
application, because the EU GI-R creates a form of protection in
each EU Member State, it does not matter whether you
79

TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 3.
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conceptualize it as the European Union failing to provide this form
of intellectual property protection or as France or Spain failing to
provide this level of protection. In other words, France is not
offering to Jamaicans, Canadians and Americans the level of
protection it provides to Spaniards, Portuguese and French, and
that is a denial of national treatment.
DR. KUR: Now it is getting very technical. First, we are
talking about a Regulation that applies on the EU level, not about
national law. There is no way to blame France for not granting
protection based on an EU Regulation. Only the European Union
is responsible.
The question, however, seems to address the relationship
between the European Union and the European Communities.
Strictly speaking, “EU” refers to the European Union, which arose
out of three agreements, 80 of which the EC Agreement is only one.
The EC, i.e. the European Communities, passed the relevant GI
legislation. This is probably why the WTO Panel report referenced
the EC rather than the EU. It is true, on the other hand—and this is
what the question seems to aim at, if I understand it correctly—that
the EU, and not the EC, has acceded to TRIPs. Obviously, the
panel did not regard this as a problem, probably because the
obligations the EU incurred under TRIPs would seem to bind the
EC as well, but this is a very technical question. I do not think that
we have to go into this.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: I think it is very technical, but you
can still make the case that France as a WTO member is providing
a form of protection. Whether it is a Community-wide regulation
or the Directive implemented in France, it does not matter. It is a
form of law.
DR. KUR: Let’s not pursue that.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Okay.
Another question?

80

See generally DESMOND DINAN, EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 233–64 (2004) (chronicling the formation of the European Union through the 1957
Treaty of Rome, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, and the 2004 Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe).
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QUESTION: I have a question for the final speaker, Professor
Scafidi. How would you suggest within your regime that—my
concern is, say, for the Native American Arts and Crafts Act81—
how would you protect against handiwork that Native Americans
did not actually make? What would be the solution for preventing
this sort of fraud?
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: I do not have a regime yet, but maybe
I will one day. That is a good question.
I think that the history of Indian Arts and Crafts Act helps
answer it. Congress passed the Act in response to lots of cheap
copies of Native American jewelry—silver and turquoise
jewelry—flooding in from other parts of the world, where
producers manufactured it cheaply, then brought to American and
labeled “Native American.”82 This same flood continues. The
difference now is that the Act proscribes this jewelry from bearing
labels such as “Native American” or “American Indian” unless a
Native American artisan actually makes it.83
The question then, of course, is: what is a Native artisan? That
gets very complicated, because it goes back to specific tribal
enrollments.84 Some individuals contest this system at the
margins, because it bars some people from enrolling even though
they have specific Native American heritage. The system is not
perfect.
The benefit, however, is essentially this: if something bears a
false label, then it is subject to challenge, as well as civil and
criminal penalties.

81

Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1159 & 25 U.S.C. §§ 305, 305d, 305e (2000)).
82
See Jennie D. Woltz, Note, The Economics of Cultural Misrepresentation: How
Should the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 Be Marketed?, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 443, 454–56 (2007).
83
See Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, §§ 104–105, 104 Stat.
4662, 4663–64 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1159 & 25 U.S.C. §§ 305, 305d,
305e (2000)).
84
See Woltz, supra note 82, at 450–453.
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MR. PLEVAN: There is a deception standard inherent in the
statute, as I recall.85
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: Yes.
QUESTION: I am curious regarding the issue of fair use in the
context Article 23 and Article 22, and what exceptions, if any,
exist. If products such as American KOBE beef, or KOBE beef in
general, were elevated to the level of Article 23 protection, what
would happen to producers of such products?
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: I think it would be a lot more serious
in terms of wines and spirits, and I think I touched on that briefly.
Certainly, Lynne would want to elaborate on that more.
You would not have those fair use permissions with respect to
wine and spirits, even if you have the correct designation alongside
the potentially misleading designation. With respect to everything
else, under Article 23 it might be fine.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: I think that is right. I do not think
anyone believes that another country could bring a WTO case
against the United States for our nominative fair use doctrine, for
example,86 so I think it is not a problem under the Article 22
deception standard.87
Under the Article 23 standard for wine and spirits, as everyone
has talked about, the relevant standard is really kind of dilution, or
maybe dilution plus.88 I do not want you to think it is across the
board, because in the Lisbon Agreement it is arguably across the
board,89 but in TRIPs it is specific to the product category.90
And as Susan said, you cannot say things like “imitation
cognac,” you cannot say “cognac-like,” you cannot say “fake
cognac.” Now, most of us would agree that if the label says “fake

85

Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, §§ 104–105, 104 Stat.
4662, 4663–64 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1159 & 25 U.S.C. § 305e (2000)).
86
See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 17. Countries may provide for exceptions to trademark
protection, although Article 17 only expressly recognizes descriptive fair use (“such as
fair use of descriptive terms . . . .”). Id.
87
See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22(2)–(3).
88
See id. art. 23(1).
89
See Lisbon Agreement, supra note 36, art. 3.
90
See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 23(1).
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cognac,” that is not truly confusing; no one is going to be
confused, so if you think that this is a fair use of the term
COGNAC, the U.S. is now obligated by treaty not to permit such
use.
I find that quite interesting because, if you are a trademark
person, attach that to your ideas of comparative advertising. We
certainly believe that Pepsi should be able to run ads to say “we’re
not Coke; we taste better.” On the other hand, there is not as far as
I know—and Ken may know much better than me—in the
comparative advertising doctrine in the United States, any case
where Pepsi-Cola or a company like that has put “Coca-Cola-like
product” or “imitation Coca-Cola” on their label.
I have a suspicion that, while we might say, “Hey, the
comparative advertising is great,” a judge might say, “You know,
you’ve crossed a little line there. ‘Coke-like product’ on your label
is going too far.” If that is your intuition, then maybe Article 23 is
not that far out.
Ken?
MR. PLEVAN: The only thing I can think of quickly is the
case that goes something like—I always forget which is the Calvin
Klein one that sold for $200 a little bottle—“If you like OPIUM,
you’ll love OBSESSION.”91 It is probably the other way around,
and maybe it is “If you like OBSESSION, you’ll love OPIUM.”
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Actually those are both brands.
You’ve got to pick another one.
MR. PLEVAN: But there are cases where it was that kind of a
comparison. I think the Second Circuit said it is just confusing
because it is not clear; it is not a true comparison.92 The true
comparative ad is one where you say your product is better than
91

Charles of the Ritz Group Ltd. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 832 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir.
1987). Charles of the Ritz, manufacturer of a fragrance it billed as OPIUM that lawfully
bore the Yves Saint Laurent brand name, actually took issue with discount fragrance
producer Deborah International Beauty’s use of the phrase “If You Like OPIUM, a
fragrance by Yves Saint Laurent, You’ll Love OMNI, a fragrance by Deborah Int’l
Beauty. Yves Saint Laurent and Opium are not related in any manner to Deborah Int’l
Beauty and Omni” as an advertisement on the exterior packaging of its less-expensive,
imitation scent OMNI. Id. at 1318.
92
Id. at 1323.
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that of a competitor; you make a true comparison, and so no
consumer is confused. Those cases simply came down as
confusion. I do not buy those sorts of perfumes. Those were cases
decided in the mid-1980s.
The holding in the classic case that applied the fair use doctrine
to comparative advertising, the METAMUCIL case in the Third
Circuit, is simply that no one would be confused when you make a
comparison because you are making a clear comparison.93
PROFESSOR HUGHES: But am I correct that those cases are
really about advertising rather than labeling? That is, Coca-Cola
does not put “better than Pepsi” on its label, and we have never had
a case about the label, rather than the advertising. Is that right?
MR. PLEVAN: That may be true. I cannot think of a case
where a competitor’s product is mentioned on a label. But usually
this is because there is a huge risk that if a competitor gets an
injunction against your ad, you pull the ad and you switch it; but if
a competitor gets an injunction against the label, you are in serious
trouble. So manufacturers—maybe it is partly heritage from the
fact that in the drug arena the FDA is involved in your label, even
though they are not involved in your advertising—historically are
just at greater risk with packaging.
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: I believe the perfume cases, the
Designer Imposter cases, involved not the label, but at least the
store display.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Yes, it was the display.
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: So it was very close.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Yes, it was very close. I agree it was
the display.
Does that help some?
QUESTION: Just a comment on the last thing you said. It is
fairly commonplace in the pharmaceutical arena to go to the local
drugstore and see generic products that state right on the label
“compare to.” So they actually do it. I have not seen a case that
decides whether this is permissible, but I have certainly seen that it
93

G.D. Searle & Co. v. Hudson Pharm. Corp., 715 F.2d 837, 843 (3d Cir. 1983).
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is commonplace that they list “compare to,” identify a specific
brand name for comparison, and usually place it on the shelf right
next to the generic product so you will not be confused at all.
MR. PLEVAN: Yes, that is absolutely right.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Very interesting.
Annette, you had something you wanted to add?
DR. KUR: Just in order to shock you a little bit more about the
lengths Europeans are ready to go to protect GIs, there is an
explicit clause in the Directive on comparative advertising
concerning products bearing so-called “denominations of origin”94
that proscribes comparing such products in advertisements for
other products that do not bear the same denomination. The clause
is of particular importance for wines, which are thus exempt from
the general rule under which comparisons are permissible as a
matter of principle.
I have wondered what the outcome would be if a party
challenged this clause before the European Court of Justice as
clashing with the principle of free speech. In Europe, we do not
have the First Amendment, but we do of course apply principles—
in particular, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights95—that protect freedom of expression. It is therefore
conceivable that one could challenge the clause successfully, but
until now, no one has tried.96
94

Council Directive 97/55, art. 3a(1), 1997 O.J. (L 290) 18, 21 (EC) (“Comparative
advertising schall, as far as the comparisson is concenred, be permitted when . . . for
products with designation of origin [the comparisson] relates in each case to products
with the same designation.”).
95
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
10(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.
This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.”).
96
The ECJ did have the opportunity recently to rule on a case dealing inter alia with
reference made to the tradidional method of producing Champagne in beer
advertisements. Case C-381/05, De Landtsheer Emmanuel SA v. Comité
Interprofessionel du Vin de Champagne and Veuve Cliquot Ponsardin SA, (Apr. 19,
2007), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=
rechercher&numaff=C-381/05. In a somewhat more liberal vein than what is suggested
in the text above, the ECJ held that the relevant provision in the directive on comparative
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PROFESSOR HUGHES: We should add that the world of
wine in Europe is itself a mare’s nest of regulations that we cannot
even begin to talk about. For example, Australians and Americans
cannot send wine to Europe and call it “table wine.”97 Americans
cannot use the word “chateau” on the label; we cannot use the
word “moulin.”98 So they have a whole vast network of
regulations beyond the geographical indications. I am not
surprised about the comparative advertising law.
Is Wine Spectator legal in Europe, with numbers and
comparisons?
DR. KUR: I don’t know. One might even have some doubts as
to that.
But as you said, it needs to be emphasized that wines are very
special. What we have been talking about so far is the general GI
regulation dealing with foodstuffs and agricultural products, which
does not cover all products, and also does not deal with wines
because they have their special regulation, which is even more
rigid, like you said.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Susan, I just have to ask, isn’t it a
cautionary tale that wines are so integral to French and Italian
identity that they end up creating a mare’s nest of regulation, and
that when a product is a paradigmatic cultural product there is a
real risk of this happening?
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: I think that in so many other areas of
the world we are so far from that level of protection that in reality
we are unlikely to approach this problem. It is certainly a
cautionary tale for legislatures in terms of what laws to pass, but at
the level of mere registration of GIs, not so much. That is a whole
other administrative battle to fight.
advertisement “must be interpreted as meaning that, for products without designations of
origin, any comparison which relates to products with desginations of origin is not
impermissible.” Id. (emphasis added).
97
Hughes, supra note 3, at 334. See generally Wine Institute International Department,
European Wine Labeling Rules for U.S. Wines (2006), http://www.calwinexport.com/
content/Compliance/New%20US%20Labeling%20regulations%20for%20European%20
Union%202006.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
98
NORBERT OLSZAK, LES APPELLATIONS D’ORIGINE ET INDICATIONS DE PROVENANCE 45
(2001).
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PROFESSOR HUGHES: I think we have a gentleman there in
a blue shirt with a tie and a question.
QUESTION: Hugh Hansen, Fordham Law School.
What is a mare’s nest, Justin? What is that?
PROFESSOR HUGHES: A mare’s nest? Are you serious?
QUESTIONER: I just never heard of it. What is it?
PROFESSOR HUGHES: It is an imbroglio.99
QUESTIONER: I understand what it is. I could figure that out
from the context. We will have to discuss this, but when this is
actually printed, I want you to have an etymology.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: I grew up on a horse farm. I can
explain it to you. It really is what a mare’s nest is.
QUESTIONER [Professor Hansen]: Okay, we will do it.
This is for Annette.
Going over to Europe, I think
geographical indications present many problems. GIs first arose at
a time when there was not any robust trademark law, as a form of
trying to protect what we are now protecting as trademark, but
trademark law as it stands also allows for horizontal competition.
GIs, in contrast, are a sort of a throwback dinosaur in that they
restrict horizontal competition. I think that is why the Commission
is pushing GIs around as a good thing, because they engender less
horizontal competition.
But when I went over there, I was surprised that Europeans
actually thought of it—and tell me if I am wrong—as a good thing
that GIs restrict horizontal competition, because part of this is a
throwback to simpler times, when people could just sort of do
things the way they always did, and not worry about the
competitive effect, or the New World, or something else. It has
sort of an anti-capitalistic tone, at least to people I spoke to, who

99
A “mare’s nest” originally connoted something fraudulent, because female horses do
not build “nests.” Over time, however, this suggestion of something deceptive evolved
into an implication of something very complicated, complex, or untidy. See, e.g.,
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 711 (10th ed. 1997) (defining a “mare’s
nest” as either “a false discovery, illusion, or deliberate hoax,” or “a place, condition, or
situation of great disorder or confusion”).
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thought it was a plus of geographical indications, of insulating
people from these influences. Do you see any of that?
DR. KUR: That is difficult to say. What the EU certainly
intended the GI regulations to do, and what they indeed do to some
extent, is protect and preserve the traditional way of doing things.
So if you mean that, then I could probably agree.
It is also interesting and to some extent typical that this form of
protection comes from France, where other, similar movements,
like the Slow Food movement, have their origin. In this sense, it is
certainly correct to say that GI protection is a reaction against
uniformity, big conglomerations, and globalization.
On the other hand, when GIs are promoted on a large scale,
like CHAMPAGNE, and PARMA—I may be wrong on this;
maybe I am really biased also, coming from Germany, where we
did not have that system, and we still do not think that it is an ideal
thing to have—it seems to me that what is going on under the
PARMA label both for ham and for cheese is hardly any different
from big industry. I therefore have some misgivings regarding the
notion that GI regulation is all about preservation of traditional,
local ways of manufacturing products.
If I may, I would use this opportunity to add the following: it
seems to me that we essentially agree on many issues. In
particular, I share with most of you here your skepticism
concerning the benefits of the EU-type of specific protection for
GIs. On both sides of the Atlantic, however, we also should be
aware of the risks inherent in a situation when specific protection
is lacking.
Take the example of Rwandan coffee Justin mentioned a while
ago. There may be a vulnerable time when a country tries to
develop the marketing potential of its designations in a given
foreign target country. The local consumers may not be aware of
the product’s origin, and that its designation has some geographical
meaning. During this time, others might want to take advantage,
either by registering a trademark analogous to this designation, or
by using it so profusely all over the place that it becomes generic.
One example for this phenomenon is the case of Basmati rice.
People in India frequently complain about Basmati having become
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generic in most Western countries, and about trademark
registrations having been accepted for designations like Texmati or
Kasmati. They argue that the legal system should have stopped
things like that in the first place.
I ask myself whether we can achieve this sort of protection,
which seems to have some merits, without imposing the
overwrought system of GI protection that the European Union tries
to promote on the international level. Maybe one could attain
results that are more sensible by resorting to general principles like
prohibition of registration in bad faith. However, I’m mentioning
this only as a point for discussion. I do have my questions and
doubts about that.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: I am not a fan of the French
regulations, but I do think the French regulations stabilize practices
to some degree. They do innately when the Institut National des
Appellations d’Origine says, “You must make your PONT
L’EVÊQUE cheese this way” or “ you must make your COMTÉ
cheese this way” or “you must make your ROQUEFORT cheese
this way.”100 In effect, it eliminates competition and it makes life
simpler for farmers or makers of a given cheese, because they
know exactly what they have to do to qualify for the GIs they need
to market their products.
Of course, what has happened to the French wine industry is,
while things were stabilized internally, the meanings of wines were
standardized, and competition was in some sense curbed by a
fixing of practice, New Zealanders, Australians, Americans and
Argentines, who do compete, who change their wines, have
absolutely pummeled the French wine industry in the global
marketplace in the past ten years.
So the problem is, even if you try to stabilize a product
nationally, and therefore stabilize some cultural element, you are
still going to nonetheless face global competitive pressures. I think
that the French lesson is a cautionary tale demonstrating that while
100

Hughes, supra note 3, at 307–08, 332. See generally Justin Hughes, Recoding
Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 926–28
(1999) (asserting that even passive audiences have an interest in stabilizing and
protecting cultural objects through copyright and trademark law).
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there may be some value in stabilizing a cultural or local practice,
this does not mean that such a practice is going to survive if it must
face the changing, evolving, and improving practices of other
countries.
DR. KUR: To the contrary, I think this might be a basic flaw of
the French policy. If one relies too heavily on GIs designations for
protection, thinking that he or she is safe since nobody else may
use those terms, there is a risk this will neglect the demands of the
market. Prices increase because of the protected designations, and
producers lose sight of the fact that consumers are clever enough to
notice that products bearing other names may be just as good, and
consequently will no longer be willing to pay higher prices for the
protected goods.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Yes.
One of the fascinating
questions here—and then we will go to some other questions—is
we do not know how valuable individual trademarks are, and we
do not really know how valuable graphical indications or
individual geographical indications are.
When Spain joined the European Union, Spanish sparkling
wine makers had to give up the word “champagne.” They adopted
the word CAVA. Nonetheless, they are selling millions of cases
more of their sparkling wine than when they used the word
“champagne.” Now, there are all kinds of things you cannot
control for—the increasing wealth in Spain, Spanish access to the
European market—but it is not necessarily the case that
“champagne” was such a valuable mark for them to begin with.
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: Let me just add quickly that none of
these arguments go to whether or not the marks are harmful. They
just go to whether or not you also need a good business method to
support the mark. The French farmers could certainly abandon
those designations and make wine in an industrial way if they
chose to, so it is just a matter of what you do with your mark once
you’ve got it.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Hold on. Some of them are making
wine in an industrial way already.
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: That’s true too.
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PROFESSOR HUGHES: I won’t let you get away with that
one, because French appellation cheeses actually have four
categories: Fermier, Artisanal, Coopérative, and Industriel,101 so
the French regulation itself recognizes that French appellation
cheeses are—a certain large amount of them—made in industrial
production facilities.
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: Fair enough, but the point is that GIs
are just one element that may contribute to commercial success.
We certainly don’t advise entrepreneurs to forego registration of
trademarks because they may or may not prove valuable.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Yes, sir, you have a question?
QUESTION: Yes. Britton Payne. I am from the Intellectual
Property Journal here at Fordham.
Professor Scafidi, you were talking about authenticity and
geographical indications strengthening community.
That is
certainly something we hear about every two years—really in
every election cycle we have—about ways to strengthen
community, so I am curious as to the extent that geographical
indications work to this end in the United States. I ask this as a
person who grew up in New Jersey and watched our two football
teams play every game with the letters “NY” on their helmets.
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: You are implying that there is culture
in New Jersey?
QUESTIONER [Mr. Payne]: You know what? I am implying
that there is culture in New Jersey. Not only would I say that there
is in fact culture in New Jersey, but that it is squashed, sort of in a
reverse-GI problem, as it becomes subsumed into the state and city
of New York. I understand that you are making a joke, but I also
understand that there is unprotected culture here.
I also made a list—Philadelphia cheese steaks and cream
cheese, Buffalo wings, Cajun catfish—all kinds of things that
ought to indicate a regional pride and a local pride, but maybe do
not because we see geographical indications as a private right
rather than a public right. So I am just curious, have geographical
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indications been effective in fostering a sense of community, not
only in major metropolitan regions, but across the country?
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: Sure. Of course, when we think
about GIs, again we do think of them as an Old World, rather than
a New World, phenomenon. We think about things that have been
around for a very long time. We think of our own society, modern
American society, conversely, as quite mobile, and we think of it
as eroding regional distinctions. So I think in some ways it is hard
for us, as Americans, to understand GIs at a very deep level.
I meant no disrespect to New Jersey, but I do think that there
are certainly regional cuisines, for example, in the United States
that do serve as points of pride, with or without GIs. Would it help
to attach GIs to such foods?
Well, you mentioned Philly cheese steaks. My spouse is from
a very, very small town in Pennsylvania, but the nearest large city
is in fact Philadelphia. He is appalled to see what passes for a
Philly cheese steak elsewhere, and even to see this term
commercialized in other places.
With or without enforcement power, there is a response, so I do
think that we have an intuition accepting of the concept of GIs,
even if we do not acknowledge it in the legal system in the same
manner as we do other things.
MR. PLEVAN: If I may just comment, for those of you who
read the obituary pages, about six months ago the inventor of the
Philadelphia cheese steak passed away.102 From a confusion point
of view, even if you get what you would consider a terrible
substitute for a Philadelphia cheese steak—let’s say in the airport
in Los Angeles—I do not think you would think it was flown in
from Philadelphia. Cheese steaks are something that inherently,
like French fries—or as we called them for a while, Freedom
fries—nobody really believes are produced in the place they are
named after. We could say the same, I suppose, of Danish pastry,
although maybe you could have a different view on that—if it is
fresh Danish pastry, it is not likely that it came in on the Concorde.
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There are a lot of names like this that you just eliminate
immediately saying, “nobody really would think that they were
made in Philadelphia,” even though I understand maybe we could
have a certification mark that would standardize Philadelphia
cheese steaks, but I doubt it.
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Can I go to what Lynne would call
30,000 feet with you on this? What you are really asking is part of
a fundamental debate or dynamic in this area. That is, technology
immigrates, and when technology immigrates, the terminology of
the technology immigrates as well. That is why in Spanish the
word for my PC is computador and why in Malaysia you watch a
televisi.
As food technology migrates, the terminology migrates. That
is what a recipe is when it has a geographic name; it is technology
migrating and it is the terminology for the technology migrating.
We simply have to decide as a policy matter when that happens
and when it does not. Trademark people call it “genericization.”103
You do not even think when you see a restaurant down this avenue
advertising “Chinese food” that that is a geographic indication
anymore. It is a recipe description, or a description of a category
of recipes.
So what we really have to decide is when we should let the
terminology migrate with the technology and when we should not.
Now when you pick up Wine Spectator, you see “California Rhone
wines.” What does that mean? Well, California Rhones are
supposedly Rhone-style wines, produced by Californians using
winemaking technology from the Rhone Valley. I am ambivalent
about this. It is merely a certain style of winemaking and a certain
style of wine, and the word comes with it. This is exactly what
Susan has been talking about today.
As an immigrant nation, it is a huge issue. Do we let the
Italians who make ice cream keep calling it gelato? So I think that
you have really touched on a fundamental dynamic here.
Other questions?

103

See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 38, § 12:1.

PANEL_II_FINAL_050807

2007

5/8/2007 1:00:31 PM

GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS

977

QUESTION: I would like to build on that. Is part of the
problem that there are not enough generic terms in use that could
take the place of GI-protected terms? Is this blurring between
generic terms and GIs causing these problems? Take, for
Example, CHAMPAGNE: instead of saying that CHAMPAGNE
describes a particular product, CHAMPAGNE could serve solely
as GI , so that the producers of champagne would have to use the
term “sparkling wine” along with the rest of the world. You would
have an isolated the geographic indicator, and then you could say,
“This is a Napa Valley sparkling wine versus a champagne
sparkling wine.”
In terms of spirits, you have Scotch whisky, Canadian whisky,
and Tennessee whiskey. Anybody who drinks whiskey recognizes
the term whiskey. The prior geographical label simply identifies
the location in which distillers produce a given brand of whiskey.
In order to expand this method into other markets, could we not
mandate the use of more descriptive terms for products while
allowing people to keep their geographical indicators?
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Well, I will turn it over to the panel,
but part of the answer is that one of the reasons we use geographic
words is for evocative purposes. When we say “Buffalo wings”
instead of “really hot chicken wings,” we are using it for a little
evocative purpose: to connect back to the origin of the thing or the
origin of the recipe. “Thai-style” something or “Thai food” may
be just signifying that there is lemon grass and cilantro in it. We
use many geographic words evocatively, and you have to also
think about protecting these uses.
So I don’t think it’s as simple as you think it is, or as simple as
you suggested it might be.
DR. KUR: One basic difficulty would be: at what point in time
do you decide how specific you want to be? For instance,
ROQUEFORT cheese would obviously not do. From the
beginning, you would have to use the term “Roquefort bleu
cheese,” or something like it, and even “bleu cheese” might as
such not be specific enough, so I see a problem there.
Apart from that, it is difficult to control the way in which
people refer to a product in common parlance, i.e. when they
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simply omit the generic term, or are not specific enough in the way
they refer to a given type of product. Who is to blame if that
happens? Who has to bear the consequences?
PROFESSOR HUGHES: Go for it, Susan.
PROFESSOR SCAFIDI: Predictably, I like the suggestion to a
degree, but I would say that what Annette is describing is the issue
of reification of culture. Culture flows. We do not want to freeze
it at any point in time, even if we do want to give the people who
originated something the right to continue to claim a cultural
affiliation with it, so I think that is at the heart of the problem.
That said, I also want to distinguish between the commercial
use of the term for evocative or descriptive purposes and for casual
personal shorthand. I think that, even if we go ahead and register
GIs, people will continue in popular parlance to call Roquefort
cheese “Roquefort cheese,” as opposed to “Roquefort-style bleu
cheese.”
PROFESSOR HUGHES: But there is an efficiency issue too.
Are you comfortable calling all hamburgers from now on “ground
beef patty sandwiches?” After all “hamburger” is a geographic
word itself.
Hamburgers, frankfurters—I think people
underestimate the extent to which our terminology is actually
based in geography.
Other questions?
[No response]
We have exhausted the audience, with three minutes to spare.
Hugh, may we declare this session ended? All right. Thank
you very much, ladies and gentlemen.

